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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendant River Ranches agrees with Plaintiff1s 
general statement of the issues presented on appeal. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
The controlling statute is found in 35-1-42 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The major portion of that 
section is set forth hereafter with the relevant and governing 
language being underlined: 
35-1-42. The following shall constitute 
employers subject to the provisions of this 
title; 
(1) The state, and each county, city, 
town and school district in the state. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corp-
oration, including every public utility, 
having in service one of more workmen or 
operatives regularly employed in the same 
business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, except agricultural 
employers who meet any one of the following 
conditions: (a) whose employees are all 
members of the immediate family of the 
employer, which employer has a proprietary 
interest in the farm; provided that the 
inclusion of any immediate family member 
under the provisions of this title is at the 
option of the employer or (b) who employ five 
or fewer persons other than immediate family 
members for 4 0 hours or more per week per each 
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any 
part of the preceding 12 months; and except 
domestic employers who do not employ one 
employee or more than one employee at least 
4 0 hours per week; provided, that employers 
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, 
shall have the right to come under the terms 
of this title by complying with the provisions 
thereof and the rules and regulations of the 
commission. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
P l a i n t i f f h a s a p p e a l e d a r u l i n g of t h e I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission a f f i r m i n g t h e o r d e r and a d o p t i n g t h e f i n d i n g s of 
f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e . 
(R 274) y 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e 
employe r R i v e r R a n c h e s was an " a g r i c u l t u r a l e m p l o y e r " p u r s u a n t 
t o § 3 5 - 1 - 4 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) U tah Code A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , and t h e r e f o r e n o t 
r e q u i r e d t o h a v e Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n I n s u r a n c e . (R 264-265) 
Under d a t e of December 2 0 , 1984 , P l a i n t i f f f i l e d an 
a p p l i c a t i o n f o r h e a r i n g and c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n of r i g h t s 
a l l e g i n g t h a t h e had b e e n i n j u r e d when th rown from a h o r s e on 
A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 8 4 . -1 
P l a i n t i f f ' s t o t a l t i m e of employment w i t h R i v e r 
Ranches was some t w e n t y - s e v e n d a y s , which t e r m i n a t e d on A p r i l 
1 7 , 1 9 8 4 , t h e d a t e on which h e s u s t a i n e d t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d 
o f h e r e i n . (R 5 5 ; T r . 30) 
I t was s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e r i s R i v e r 
R a n c h e s , a l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p , whose p a r t n e r s a r e e x c l u s i v e l y 
— References t o the record paginated pursuant t o Rule 11(b) Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure (URAP) a r e preceeded by the l e t t e r "R." The 
hearing t r a n s c r i p t i s referenced both with respect t o vdiere i t appears in 
the overa l l record and a l s o as paginated by the r epor t e r , the l a t t e r 
being preceeded by the l e t t e r s "Tr." 
2/ 
—' No explanation was given for the Plaintiff fs delay in filing the 
application, though the record reveals that at the time of his employment 
with River Ranches Plaintiff was receiving Workmen's Compensation benefits 
fron the State of Wyoming growing out of an injury of March, 1979, which 
compensation continued to flew to Plaintiff through November of 1984, the 
month preceeding the filing of his application herein. (R 47, 56-57; Tr. 
22, 31-32) 
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from the family of Lloyd and Melva Johnson, of Aurora, Utah. 
(R 28-31; Tr. 3-6) The relationship of the partners to each 
other is helpful to understanding the employer. Lloyd and 
Melva are the grandfather and grandmother respectively. 
3/ 
There are two sons, Jerold — and Burke, and five grandsons, 
Jerold Jr., Gordon, Dave, Mark and Vince. The first two 
grandsons belong to the son Jerold, and the other three 
belong to the son Burke. The general partners are the grandfather 
and his two sons; the limited partners are the grandmother 
and the five grandsons. (Id.) 
The grandfather and the two sons are actively 
involved in the daily operation and management of the partnership 
and receive compensation therefor. (R 70-71; Tr. 45-46) The 
grandfather is the "boss.M (R 66; Tr. 41) The partnership 
is engaged in farming, including the raising of crops and 
livestock. (I<d.) There was no evidence that the grandsons 
Jerold Jr. or Gordon were directly involved, and the other 
three grandsons only worked part time. Mark and Vince were 
full-time students at Utah State University in Logan other 
than during the summer months. (R 72-73; Tr. 47-48) They 
would have resided at home during the times they worked on 
the family farm. (Ixl.) The other grandson Dave lived in a 
trailer part of the time and at the farm the other part. 
(Id.) 
— The names of Jerold and Jerold Jr. were erroneously spelled "Gerald" 
in the reporter's transcript. 
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In his brief filed herein, Plaintiff has unfairly 
and inaccurately drawn conclusions and inferences from the 
evidence concerning "non-family employees" as well as the 
evidence presented in support of River Ranches1 exemption 
from the statutory duty of providing Workmen1s Compensation 
coverage. The necessary clarification, though essentially 
factual in nature, is treated in the argument portion of the 
brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While Plaintiff argues certain general propositions, 
his real claim of error is three-fold. The claims are (1) 
the findings of the Industrial Commission are not supported 
by any substantial evidence in the record, (2) River Ranches 
failed to produce any evidence to rebut Plaintiff's case, and 
(3) a partnership cannot have "immediate family members" and 
therefore cannot claim an exemption under the statute. 
River Ranches' argument is responsive in nature, 
treating Plaintiff's three propositions in the order stated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD. 
The standards of review in Industrial Commission 
cases is extremely narrow. This Court will uphold the factual 
findings of the Commission if they are supported by "evidence 
of any substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded as 
supporting the determination made. . . . " Utah Dept. of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 6 58 
P.2d 601 at 609 (Utah 1983) [quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. 
-5-
Employees v. Dept. of Employment Security, 13 Utah 262, 264-
65, 372 P.2d 987-989 (1962)], also Davey v. Board of Review, 
unpublished opinion in Case No* 20146 filed October 16, 1985. 
The only factual determination made by the Commission 
had to do with the number of "non-family" employees. Evidence 
on this subject came from three sources: (1) the testimony of 
Plaintiff, (2) the testimony of Burke Johnson, general partner, 
River Ranches, and (3) the duly admitted records of River 
Ranches. The evidence from all three sources was in accord. 
Plaintiff, in response to questions from his 
counsel, identified three persons other than himself who 
worked for River Ranches. There were two sheepherders, Mark 
Barton and Cameron Conner, and one boy who worked in the shop 
named Richard Boyack. (R 50-51; Tr. 25-26) He was asked 
about Carlyle Bird, a sheepherder, but testified that "I 
didn't see him. He quit when I went to work there, and I 
never saw him." (R. 53; Tr. 28) (Further, see Plaintiff's 
testimony during cross examination R 57-58; Tr. 32-33.) 
River Ranches general partner Burke Johnson identi-
fied the same parties, to-wit Mark Barton, Cameron Conner and 
Richard Boyack. Plaintiff's brief draws an unfair inference 
from Johnson's testimony appearing in the record at R 57-58; 
Tr. 42-43. Beginning with line 22 at R 67, the following 
appears: 
Q (By Mr. Dabney) Now would it be a 
fair statement to say--I just want to mention 
some names—that Mark Barton would fall within 
that category? He worked for a period in 
excess of that I just read to you? 
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A I would think so, yes. 
Q Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And Mr. Cameron Conner, he would 
also be in that category would be not? 
A I would think he probably could. 
Q And Richard Boyack would be in that 
same category? 
A Yes. 
Q And Carlyle Bird would be in that 
same category? 
A I would question that. 
Q All right. That one you1re not 
sure about. So we have those three that 
would meet that qualification? 
A I believe so. 
From the foregoing dialogue, Plaintiff asserts in 
his brief as follows: 
Moreover, he [Burke Johnson] testified that 
another employee, Carlyle Bird, might also 
satisfy the work requirements of the Act. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 2.) 
It is obvious from the text that Mr. Johnson's 
affirmative and concluding answer acknowledged only that 
there would be "three that would meet [the statutory] quali-
fication." In fact, Mr. Johnson later gave specific testimony 
regarding three persons with the surname "Bird:" Of Wayne he 
said, "I would not think that he fits at all, no" (R 69; 
Tr. 44); of Glen he said, "In fact, he would have worked much 
less than Wayne Bird" (Icl.) ; and of Carlyle he testified, 
"Mr. Carlyle Bird and Mr. Glen Bird worked for us from approximately 
-7-
the 7th day of March, until the time that they quit prior to 
Mr. Barton's employment, which would have been . • . approx-
imately the 20th of March. Somewhere around there. So 
possibly two to three weeks would be the most they could be 
considered at that time." (R 69-70; Tr. 44-45) 
The Administrative Law Judgefs finding of four 
employees included the Plaintiff. (R 264-5) Since Plaintiff 
only worked twenty-seven days, he would not have met the 
statutory requirements to be counted toward the six "non-
family" employees required to defeat the exemption. [3 5-1-
42(2)(b)] 
Not only does the evidence support the finding of 
four employees, including Plaintiff, it reveals that this was 
to be temporary, and that Plaintiff was to replace one of the 
others, thereby returning the number of regular employees to 
three. Plaintiff testified of this fact: 
MR McIFF: Q Was there any discussion, 
that you recall, about the need for a temporary 
sheepherder, because of a new herd that had 
been purchased, that was lambing different 
from another herd, but would later be merged 
into that herd? 
A Yes. 
Q And don't you recall that you were 
only to be employed for a brief time, while 
they had to keep that one herd separated? 
A No. Because me and Lloyd talked 
about it, and the guy that was going to herd 
that herd was going to quit. 
Q Cameron Conner? 
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A Yes, And if I could handle the 
job, I would have a steady job. He said he 
would guarantee me nine months out of the 
year. 
Q Okay. 
But Cameron Conner would quit, you would 
replace him, and then there would just be you 
and Mark? [exclusive of Richard Boyack in 
the shop] 
A Yes. 
Q Is that the way you understood it? 
A Yes, thatfs basically the way. 
(R 60; Tr. 35) 
The third source of evidence in the action consisted 
of River Ranches1 records discussed in the succeeding argument. 
Not only does this evidence "support" the finding of the 
Administrative Law Judge, it cannot fairly be construed any 
other way. 
II. RIVER RANCHES SUBMITTED BOTH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY. 
Plaintiff alleges an absence of evidence presented 
4/ by River Ranches. —' 
Plaintiff totally disregards the fact that extensive 
documentary evidence produced by River Ranches was admitted 
at Plaintiff's request prior to the testimony of Burke Johnson, 
a general partner in River Ranches, and whom Plaintiff called 
as a witness. The following dialogue took place: 
4/ 
— See, e.g., the following allegation appearing at page two of Plaintiff's 
brief, "At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, River Ranches declined to 
present any testimony or documentary evidence to rebut Plaintiff's case. 
Tr. 74. Instead, Defendant moved for an order dismissing Plaintiff's 
claim. Tr. 74." 
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MR. DABNEY: Before I begin with my 
questioning of Mr. Johnson, Your Honor,--
Perhaps, Mr. Mclff, would you like to 
mark your documents that you have provided to 
me informally? 
MR. McIFF: Yes. That will be just fine. 
Would you like all of them? 
MR. DABNEY: That's probably a good idea. 
(R 61; Tr. 36] 
Counsel for River Ranches then proceeded to have 
marked ten separate documentary exhibits, all of which were 
admitted in evidence without objection. (R 63, 65; Tr. 38, 
40) 
The ten documents offered by River Ranches and 
received in evidence cover the year preceeding Plaintiff1s 
injury, as well as several months thereafter, and include 
partnership payroll records, partnership income tax returns, 
spread sheets showing all disbursements from partnership 
funds, partnership copies of all employee withholding state-
ments, a labor record in graph form reflecting times of 
employment by every person employed at any time by River 
Ranches for whatever period of time, and other documents 
Which had been produced by River Ranches as a result of a 
discovery request by Plaintiff. 
All of the River Ranch documents offered and received 
in evidence were made available to Plaintiff pursuant to 
discovery before the hearing, and Plaintiff conducted a 
thorough examination of Mr. Johnson while the latter was on 
the witness stand. 
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At the conclusion of Plaintiff1s case, River Ranches 
moved for a dismissal. Its documentary evidence and the 
testimony of one of its general partners was already before 
the Court, and it would have been superfluous and wholly 
unproductive to have replowed the same ground in some kind of 
rebuttal. It is of no consequence that the evidence defeating 
Plaintifffs claim came in during his case in chief. 
The lack of merit as well as consistency in Plain-
tiff's effort to cloud the record with "factual" arguments 
and "burden-of-going-forward distinctions" can be seen from 
the highly revealing closing argument made by Plaintiff's 
counsel to the Administrative Law Judge, to-wit: 
MR. DABNEY: Let me address this. 
Your Honor, when we came in today, we had 
essentially--perhaps a little background to 
assist the Court--we had essentially three 
possible arguments that we had for satisfying 
the statute. 
The first was a distinction between 
ranching and farming. And, as a result of Mr. 
Johnson's testimony, the possibility of distin-
guishing an earlier 1922 Supreme Court of Utah 
sheepherder case was eliminated, because of 
the exceptance of the alternative operation of 
farming along with the ranching. 
The second possibility that we had was 
attempting to discern—there was another Utah 
case on this point—to define some of the 
family members if you will, the Johnson family 
members, as not being immediate family members, 
in the sense that they did not live in the 
household of the particular identified father 
and grandfather. As a result of Mr. Johnson's 
testimony, once again it became obvious that 
we do not have enough bodies to add up to six, 
to meet that particular exception. 
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So what we're down to then—having 
struck out on those first two—we're now down 
to our third possible argument. [R 75; 
Tr. 50] 
Plaintiff's third and final argument is the same 
made herein, and is the subject of the next section. 
III. PARTNERSHIPS ARE NOT EXCLUDED FROM QUALIFYING FOR THE 
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION. 
A. The statute is controlling: The statutory 
language would appear to be both the starting and ending 
point to this inquiry. In relevant part it provides as 
follows, to-wit: 
The following shall constitute employers 
subject to the provisions of this title . . . 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation 
. . . except agricultural employers . . . (b) 
who employ five or fewer persons other than 
immediate family members for forty hours or 
more per week per each employee for thirteen 
consecutive weeks during any part of the 
preceeding twelve months . . . . [35-1-42 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended] 
The term "employers" is specifically defined as 
including "every person, firm and private corporation." The 
agricultural exemption applies without any redefinition of 
the term "employer." The "employer" as thus defined can have 
"immediate family members" as a matter of law. The limiting 
factor on entitlement to claim the exemption is not the 
particular "form" of the employer, but rather the nature of 
its business and its size. 
B #
 The legislative history supports the Commission 
decision: Utah Farm Bureau Federation, appearing as amicus 
curiae herein, has filed an extremely useful brief tracking 
the legislative history of 35-1-42 through the 1975 and 1983 
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legislative sessions• 
No useful purpose would be served by duplicating 
the Farm Bureau argument. One exchange in the Utah Senate is 
pointed out for emphasis. Senate President Ferry specifically 
asked one of the sponsors, Senator Cary Peterson, whether or 
not the exemption applied to partnerships and corporations, 
and Senator Peterson replied, "I believe it does." [Utah 
Senate minutes of February 10, 1983, attached as Appendix 2 
to brief of amicus curiae Utah Farm Bureau Federation, at 
9.] 
The legislative debates discussed in the Utah Farm 
Bureau brief further indicate a strong variance of opinion 
among legislators regarding the desireability or lack thereof 
of the agricultural exemption. Considerable care was employed 
in arriving at the final language. Amendments were debated 
and either accepted or rejected. If the exemption were to 
have been limited to sole proprietorships, that is a condition 
that would have been easy to adopt with appropriate language. 
The fact that the subject was before the legislature 
at a recent time, that it was debated in a context of strong 
differing views, and that the language employed survived the 
debate and amending processes forms a sound basis for a 
reviewing court to decline any attempt to add conditions or 
limitations not adopted by the legislature. As was stated in 
Bd. of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen, 6 84 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1984): 
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Utah's workers1 compensation scheme is a 
purely statutory creation. This court cannot 
expand the statute to subjects not included in 
its provisions. [At 51, citing Brigham City 
et al. v. Industrial Commission 66 Utah 390, 
392, 243 P. 113, 113-114 (1926).] 
It further appears from the legislative history of 
the 1983 amendment that the Industrial Commission was consulted 
and had input in the legislative process. See, e.g., House 
Minutes of January 18, 1983; Appendix 2, Brief of amicus 
curiae Utah Farm Bureau Federation, at 2, and Senate Minutes 
of February 10, 1983, Id_. at 5-6. 
C. Judicial deference to an agency construction 
may be appropriate: The Commission, by its ruling herein, 
has interpreted the agricultural exemption provision and its 
relationship to family partnerships. That interpretation may 
be entitled to some deference in this Court. 
In Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, supra, this Court draws a distinction 
between questions of "general law" and questions of "special 
law." As to the former, the Court applies a "correction-of-
error standard" with no deference afforded an agency construc-
tion. The Court includes questions of "special law" in an 
area of "intermediate issues" which lie between "general law" 
questions on one hand, and on the other basic questions of 
fact, where the "greatest" deference is afforded an agency 
ruling. It is suggested that this middle ground, where 
judicial deference exists to varying degrees, includes inter-
pretation of statutory law, which an agency is empowered to 
administer. (IcL at 609-610.) See, also, Wells Fargo Armored 
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Service v. Public Service, 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981). In the 
event this Court determines that some deference to Commission 
construction would be appropriate, then the standard is 
5/ 
stated thus: — 
The degree of deference extended to the decisions 
of the Commission on these intermediate types 
of issues has been given various expressions, 
but al1 are variations of the idea that the 
Commissions decisions must fall within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
[Id. at 610.] 
It is respectfully submitted that the agency construc-
tion is both reasonable and rational, and any other decision 
would place form over substance and be defeative of the 
family farm sought to be protected when the legislation was 
adopted. I t would result in discrimination without a rational 
basis, a point effectively made by amicus curiae Utah Farm 
Bureau Federation in i ts brief, citing appropriate authority. 
D. Whether or not a partnership is a separate 
entity is not controlling: Given the language of the statute 
in question, i t may be immaterial whether or not a partnership 
is considered a separate employing legal entity. Nevertheless, 
Plaintiff's argument thereon could be misleading. The old 
Utah case Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 
284 (1932) does not necessarily stand for the proposition 
—
/
 The author of this brief has purposely employed caution in relying 
on the concept of judicial deference to an agency construction of a 
statute i t is charged with administering. That caution is premised on 
the somewhat elusive nature of the so-called "intermediate issues" and on 
this Court's opinion in Bd. of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen, 
supra, where the interpretation of the implications of certain statutory 
provisions was deemed a matter of "general law" and judicial deference to 
agency expertise was considered inapplicable. 
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advanced by Plaintiff, In that case, the Court held invalid 
as against the partnership and individual partners a compensation 
award based on a claim against an individual partner without 
an indication in the pleadings that demand was against the 
partnership or against him as a partner. In the course of 
the opinion and in reviewing specific statutes then in force, 
the Court said, "Let it be assumed that under such a statute 
the partnership is regarded as a legal entity and as such may 
be sued." (7 P.2d at 288.) This cannot be said to have 
resolved the issue "once and for all" and is not very persuasive 
authority for the use to which Plaintiff would put it. 
The thrust of Plaintiff's position is that a partnership 
"is a thing, an inanimate entity incapable of procreation." 
(Plaintiff1s brief at 9.) As previously argued, the legislature 
did not draw the fine lines or impose the additional conditions 
which Plaintiff seeks to impose. There is, however, another 
fundamental problem with Plaintiff's position premised as it 
is on the assumption that if partners cannot qualify as 
"family members," then they must be considered "employees." 
The prevailing view is to the contrary. That is especially 
true where, as here, the three persons sought to be treated 
as employees, to-wit the grandfather Lloyd and his two sons 
Jerold and Burke, were "working partners" involved in the 
daily operation and management of the family farming operation. 
Plaintiff has cited the Court to Professor Larson's 
treatise on Workmen's Compensation Law. The following appears 
therein: 
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With the exception of Oklahoma and Louisiana, 
every state that has dealt judicially with the 
status of "working partners" or joing venturers 
has held that they cannot be employees. 
California and Nevada have included by special 
statutory enactment working partners who 
receive separate wages beyond their share in 
the profits, and Michigan has included them, 
to the extent premiums are based on their 
earnings, without the requirement of separate 
wages above profits. Ohio passed a similar 
provision, but it was declared unconstitutional. 
In Utah and Oregon coverage of partners may be 
elected. [Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
Vol 1C, § 54.30.] 
In the sections which follow the above quoted, 
Professor Larson points out that courts have been more willing 
to treat the partnership as a separate entity where the 
claimant is someone other than a partner. Such cases avoid 
the conceptual obstacle of having the same person at one time 
appear as both employer and employee. The non-partner employee 
simply lodges a claim against the partnership. 
The conceptual obstacle, however, is at the heart 
of what Plaintiff seeks to do in this case. The only possibility 
of reaching the number of "employees" required to overcome 
the agricultural exemption is to count as "employees" the 
three general partners of River Ranches, who are at the same 
time the "employers." Professor Larson cites numerous examples 
of where the conceptual obstacle is less direct, including 
cases where partners have successfully pursued compensation 
claims through other family members whose status has been 
clearly limited to that of an "employee." Professor Larson 
then states, "It is a much heavier task to segregate the 
partnership entity to such an extent that the same person can 
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be both employer and employee." 
Professor Larson's solution to the general problem 
under discussion is this: "Usually this issue would be 
settled by the listing of partnerships or unincorporated 
bodies in the statutory definition of employers." (§ 54:31) 
In Utah, of course, the section under discussion (35-1-42) 
has done just that. The term "employer" includes enumerated 
public entities and "every person, firm and private corporation." 
That eliminates all necessity of arguing about what is or is 
not a "legal entity." At the same time, it avoids the problem 
of whether or not a partnership has the power of "procreation." 
Such is simply a non-issue, since the legislature has not 
drawn a distinction between the type of "employer" who can 
qualify for the agricultural exemption. The statute simply 
states that "agricultural employers . . . who employ five or 
fewer persons other than immediate family members, etc." 
qualify for the exemption. The word "employers," by definition, 
includes "persons, firms and private corporations." The 
exemption is lost not by formation of a family partnership, 
but rather when the operation goes too far beyond the family 
circle, i.e. six non-family employees. 
It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of the 
exemption, rather it is this Courtfs primary responsibility 
in construing the legislation to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature. American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1984); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 
755 (Utah 1982). That can only be done by taking the statute 
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Mas is" and by applying it without imposition of conditions 
or limitations which the legislature did not see fit to 
impose. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the statute governs. River 
Ranches is an "employer" as the term is defined. As such, it 
is eligible for exempt status if it meets the statutory 
requirements as to type of business and number of employees. 
There is solid evidence duly admitted that its business was 
agriculture and that it employed fewer than six persons other 
than immediate family members. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the Commission 
and award River Ranches its costs. /i 
Respectfully submitted this 1( ^J day of December, 
1985. 
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